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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS: HAVE THINGS
CHANGED SINCE ENRON?
James D. Cox* and Randall S. Thomast
with the Assistance of Dana Kiku $
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. securities laws seek to fulfill a variety of social objec-
tives.1 The most obtuse of them is allocational efficiency. Mandatory
disclosure requirements for public offerings facilitates the allocation
of scarce capital directly among competing investment opportunities
and periodic disclosure does so indirectly through its impact on inves-
tors' decisions with respect to the array of risk-return relationships
that compete for their savings. Mandatory disclosure also reduces the
frequency and magnitude of fraud thus reducing the risk and losses to
investors. Furthermore, the greater transparency provided by Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure requirements is be-
lieved to reduce agency costs on the part of managers. Greater
transparency not only protects investor-owners, but also contributes
positively to efficient deployment of firm resources.
The mechanisms for mandatory disclosure under the U.S. securi-
ties laws are well understood. Disclosure is mandated episodically for
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
t John S. Beasley II Professor of Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School, and
Professor of Management, Owen School of Management, Vanderbilt University.
Department of Economics, Duke University.
I See generally INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION § 4.1 (1998) (setting forth three core objectives of securities regula-
tion-protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and
transparent; and reduction of systematic risk), available at http://wwwl.worldbank.
org/publicsector/legal/Objectives&Principles%20for%2OSecurities%Reg.doc; RICH-
ARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1-6 (8th ed. 1998) (discussing con-
sumer protection, informational needs of investors, allocative efficiency, corporate
governance and "agency costs," economic growth innovation, and access to capital);
Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9J. CORP.
L. 1, 9 (1983) (explaining five principal arguments to justify the securities regulation
system).
HeinOnline  -- 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 893 2004-2005
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
such events as public offerings, 2 proxy solicitations, 3 and tender of-
fers.4 Most public companies also face periodic disclosure require-
ments.5 Less formal requirements for disclosure arise by virtue of
disclosure obligations anchored in the antifraud provision, such as the
duty to update. 6 These extensive disclosure requirements are backed
up by a reasonably well-funded government agency, the SEC, as well as
express and implied causes of actions for private litigants. 7 Thus, a
company manifesting anything less than undying obeisance to compli-
ance with mandatory disclosure requirements must confront the possi-
bility of a less than genteel encounter with the staff of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement and/or the private class action attorney.
America is unique not only in the governmental funds it commits to
the enforcement of its securities laws, but also in the extent that pri-
vate suits for alleged violations occur. The latter is not the product of
rumored greater litigiousness of the U.S. citizens, but most likely re-
flects the effects of collateral legal rules such as the "American Rule"
respecting parties' responsibility for attorneys fees, the availability of
contingent fees, and, of course, the class action.
So robust is the securities class action that with great confidence
the attorney can advise her client that one is far more likely to en-
counter the plaintiffs' securities class action lawyer than SEC enforce-
ment personnel. This observation raises a wide range of questions
2 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
3 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a); Exchange Act
Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2004).
4 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) (1),
78n (d) (1). -
5 The companies so subject to the requirements are those falling within section
12(a) or 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (g), which for do-
mestic issuers requires annual and quarterly reporting and sometimes relatively
prompt reporting of certain events required to be disclosed on Form 8-K. See also
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (setting forth the requirements
and mechanisms for periodic reporting).
6 See, e.g., Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding
that there is a duty to disclose material change in financial limits on debt that would
be required by a forthcoming acquisition). Even broader than the duty to update is
the case law surrounding half-truths, which imposes a duty to disclose so as to avoid
having what has been represented not to be materially misleading in light of what has
not been disclosed. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half Truths: Protecting Mistaken
Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1999) (examining the half-truth
doctrine of securities law in the context of the half-truth doctrine that exists in the
common law of fraud).
7 See generally JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS chs. 12-13 (4th ed. 2004) (reviewing the SEC's enforcement authority and the
scope of private actions under the antifraud provision).
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which we seek to answer in this Article. Foremost among our ques-
tions is the overall effectiveness of the public and private enforcement
efforts. Given the doubts raised about the.quality of American corpo-
rate governance practices after the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and
other subsequent corporate disasters, this is a particularly timely issue.
We address this question by gathering evidence on how those cor-
porations that have been the targets of SEC enforcement efforts com-
pare in terms of their size and financial health vis-A-vis firms that are
targeted only by the private securities class action. Related to this in-
quiry is whether the SEC or the private bar systematically proceeds
against violators that cause the greatest loss to investors. As to the
latter inquiry, we are intrigued by the most basic questions posed by
private suits: whether settlements bear any relationship to the losses
suffered by the class and whether those losses bear any relationship to
the size of either the firm itself or the duration of the class action.
The data examined below is expanded beyond that in our earlier
study contrasting the profiles of firms that are the subject of SEC en-
forcement actions with firms that are prosecuted through a private
class action suit.8 The evidence presented below provides additional
insight into the social welfare implications of SEC enforcement
heuristics as well as the overall performance of the securities class
action.
I. METHODOLOGY
Our data set consists of 389 securities class action settlements that
occurred between 1990 and 2003. For this data set, we obtained from
the Compustat database certain financial information, discussed be-
low, regarding the companies that were the defendants in the settled
securities class actions. We then reviewed the Enforcement Releases
on the SEC's website as well as conducting a search of the Lexis-Nexis
database. From these searches, we identified seventy-three cases, or
nineteen percent of our sample, that had a parallel SEC enforcement
action challenging the same conduct that was the subject of the pri-
vate suit.
A central reference point in our assessment of the effectiveness of
SEC or private enforcement actions is to compare the dollar amount
of the relief obtained from the defendants with the estimated "prova-
8 SeeJames D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DuKE L.J. 737 (2003) (presenting a study compiled with the assistance of
Dana Kiku). Our earlier study included about forty percent fewer settlements than
the present study, and we have since expanded our database to include settlements
that extend into 2003.
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ble losses" their violation has caused investors. The standard measure
of damages for securities class actions is the difference between the
price at which the investors purchased or sold the security and what
that price would have been but for the misrepresentation. We refer to
this as the "provable loss" for the class. Because the defendant is re-
sponsible only for the harm it has caused by its misrepresentation,
other events and forces that affect the securities price must be re-
moved from the calculus for measuring the provable loss. To do this,
we use the familiar market model to construct a "true-value line" for
each of the 389 settlements in our database.
The market model holds:
= ai +/3 R, + E,
where Rt is the return of a stock on day i for time period t, R,, is the
return of a market index for time period t, ai is the asset specific inter-
cept, fPi is the observed correlation of the individual return of security
i, and j,, is the so-called error term which is that portion of the stock
return that cannot be explained by market-wide events.
We have used the Equal-Weighted Market Index provided by the
Center for Research Securities Prices as our market index. To deter-
mine the individual security's /, we used data on individual stock
prices for a two-year period ending six months before the commence-
ment of the class action period. We terminated our /3 calculations six
months before the commencement of the class action period because
our data sample consistently reflected abnormal stock price behavior
in the three-to-six month period before the commencement of the
class period. Using the market model, we estimated the unexplained
return, Eit.
We then derived the true value line by using our estimates of /l
and E and going backward in time beginning with the company's
stock price the day after the close of the class action period (the secur-
ity's market price in response to disclosure of truthful information).9
After that we calculated the difference between the actual market
price and the true value line at each point during the class period.
The next step toward measuring the provable losses for the class
is to determine how to weigh these losses by estimating the trading
that occurred during the class action period. Here there are two well-
9 See generally Harindra de Silva et al., Securities Act Violations: Estimation of Dam-
ages, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTANT AS EXPERT WIT-
NESS ch. 44 (Roman L. Weil et al. eds., 1995); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan,
Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV.
883, 888 (1990) (evaluating the market model approach to measuring damages and
analyzing the legal questions raised by the approach).
[VOL. 8o:3
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accepted approaches-the one-trader and the two-trader models.10
The one-trader model assumes that each share within the class period
has an equal probability of being traded at a given time during the
class period. Thus, on any given day during the class period, the
shares that are sold are drawn randomly from all outstanding shares
so that the resulting class is made up of shares that have not been
traded since acquired in the class period and those that were acquired
from others who purchased the securities within the class period. The
two-trader model divides investors into two sets according to their
probable trading propensities. One set is high-active traders and the
other is low-active traders. We assume low-active traders hold about
63% of the shares and account for 17% of the trading, so that high-
active traders hold 37% of the shares and account for 83% of the trad-
ing. 1 ' These models, because they make different assumptions re-
garding to the magnitude of in-and-out trading, yield quite different
provable damage estimates. Because we believe that the two-trader
model's assumptions are more consistent with observed market behav-
ior, we use it in estimating provable losses.
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In our earlier work, we examined the overlap between securities
fraud class actions filed solely by private plaintiffs and those class ac-
tions which accompany SEC enforcement actions. 12 We found that
only about 15% of settled private actions in our sample of pre-2002
cases had accompanying SEC enforcement actions. In matters where
both the SEC and private plaintiffs filed cases concerning the same
alleged misconduct, the private plaintiffs recovered statistically signifi-
cantly larger recoveries in cases that settled more rapidly than those
class actions where the private plaintiffs proceeded alone. Several
other important results emerged: (1) the SEC targeted statistically sig-
nificantly smaller market capitalization companies than private plain-
tiffs who filed actions in matters which the government did not
pursue; and (2) the SEC's choice of enforcement targets was best pre-
dicted by indicators of financial distress, while measures of provable
losses, asset size, and length of class period did not appear to influ-
10 See generally Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descrip-
tive Study, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 491, 496-97 (1996) (explaining the one-trader and two-
trader models).
11 We use data provided by MARCIA KRAMER MAYER, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH As-
SOCS., BEsT-FIT ESTIMATION OF DAMAGE VOLUME IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: THE
MULTI-SECTOR, MULTI-TRADER MODEL OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR (2000), available at
http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p-ID=924.
12 Cox & Thomas, supra note 8.
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ence the SEC's decision over which companies to pursue in enforce-
ment cases.
A. Descriptive Statistics and Bi-Variate Analysis
In this paper, we have expanded our sample to include a larger
number of class action settlements including many that occurred after
2001. More specifically, we now have a sample of 389 securities fraud
class actions. Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the entire
sample.
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE
SeteIn Am Jno Private AcIon (mIIill ionIs o dollars)
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 11.5 5.3 316
With a parallel SEC action 23.6 8.0 73
Total Sample 13.8 5.7 389
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 1955.6 219.0 286
With a parallel SEC action 4931.9 202.0 66
Total Sample 2513.6 216.6 352
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 11.7 9.0 316
With a parallel SEC action 17.7 15.7 73
Total Sample 12.8 10.5 389
TIn to RahSttlementIi (months)
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 29.0 26.3 312
With a parallel SEC action 27.1 23.7 72
Total Sample 28.6 25.5 384
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 11.8% 6.1% 316
With a parallel SEC action 16.2% 6.5% 73
Total Sample 12.7% 6.1% 389
For the sample as a whole, what we see is that class actions with-
out parallel SEC actions result in lower average (median) settlements,
are brought against on average (but not median) smaller market capi-
[VOL. 80:3
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talization companies, have shorter average (median) class periods,
and take longer on average (median) to reach settlement.1 3 These
results are similar to those in our earlier paper with the exception of
the average market capitalization comparisons, which show a large re-
versal (although the median values do not).
We also added to this table statistics on the ratio of absolute set-
tlement amount to estimated provable losses. We see that the average
ratio of settlement amount to provable losses is higher for private ac-
tions with parallel SEC actions, but that the median values are roughly
the same. The differences in the median values are statistically
insignificant.
However, these average values may conceal changes that have oc-
curred in recent years after the collapse of Enron and ensuing corpo-
rate governance reforms. In particular, our data set permits us to
determine if the SEC's approach to enforcement has changed during
the post-Enron period. To examine this issue, we split our sample
into pre-January 1, 2002, and post-January 1, 2002 (the divide being
roughly one month after the Enron bankruptcy), and compare the
two sub-samples. Tables 2 and 3 present these statistics.
Our data for the pre-2002 period for our expanded sample show
very similar patterns to those in our earlier paper. We see that private
suits that are filed against companies without parallel SEC enforce-
ment actions result in smaller settlements, target larger companies,
have shorter class periods, and are slightly slower to settle. Moreover,
if we look at the ratio of settlement to provable losses, we see that
private suits without parallel SEC enforcement proceedings recover a
lower percentage of losses.
When we test for the significance of these differences, we find
that median market capitalization and median settlement-to-provable-
losses ratios are statistically different across the two sub-samples at the
10% level of significance. The difference in median class periods is
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 3 sets forth similar data on the settlements in our sample
that occurred afterJanuary 1, 2002. We see a different pattern in the
settlements during this time period.
The settlement amount data show a dramatic increase in the size
of settlements in private actions where the SEC has also filed an en-
13 The differences of the medians of the settlement amount and class period
across the two sub-samples are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance.
The other bi-variate comparative tests are statistically insignificant. Throughout the
Article, we test the median differences for significance because of the presence of
large outliers in the data.
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SETTLEMENTS
PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 2002
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 10.1 5.0 248
With a parallel SEC action 11.5 6.6 52
Total Sample 10.3 5.5 300
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 1789.9 196.9 229
With a parallel SEC action 692.8 134.9 48
Total Sample 1599.7 184.8 277
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 11.2 9.0 248
With a parallel SEC action 15.4 12.9 52
Total Sample 12.0 9.6 300
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 27.1 24.1 244
With a parallel SEC action 26.1 23.1 51
Total Sample 26.9 23.8 295
Rat io of Se ttlement A1munt to Provable ( %)
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 12.3% 6.6% 248
With a parallel SEC action 20.8% 8.3% 52
Total Sample 13.8% 7.1% 300
forcement case. During this time period, we see that the size of the
average settlements shown in private suits with parallel SEC cases are
more than triple those where there is a private class action alone,
while the median values are almost triple. The difference in the medi-
ans is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. If we com-
pare these values with those in the pre-January 1, 2002, cases shown in
Table 2, we see that the average settlement size increased for both
categories but this increase was much larger for private cases with par-
allel SEC filings. The median values show little change for private
suits alone over the two time periods, but a very large increase in me-
dian settlements for private suits with parallel SEC proceedings.
Within the group of cases with a parallel SEC action, the difference in
[VOL. 8o:3
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TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SETTLEMENTS
AFTER JANUARY 1, 2002
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 16.6 5.6 68
With a parallel SEC action 53.7 16.0 21
Total Sample 25.4 7.1 89
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 2621.3 584.5 57
With a parallel SEC action 16,236.4 1806.0 18
Total Sample 5889.0 806.6 75
Cliss. Perid (moths)
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 13.5 9.068
With a parallel SEC action 23.3 20.6 21
Total Sample 15.8 12.7 89
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 35.8 30.2 68
With a parallel SEC action 29.4 24.9 21
Total Sample 34.3 28.7 89
Ratioof Sttlemnt Aount to Provable Lse %
Mean Median Number of observations
Without a parallel SEC action 10.2% 4.3% 68
With a parallel SEC action 4.8% 2.4% 21
Total Sample 8.9% 4.0% 89
the medians of the settlement amount across the pre-January 1, 2002,
and post-January 1, 2002, sub-samples is statistically significant at the
1% level.
Similarly striking changes occurred in the average market capital-
ization of defendant firms. If we compare the post-January 1, 2002,
cases with those for the earlier time period, we see that average mar-
ket capitalization more than tripled in the latter period. Median com-
parisons over time show an even more pronounced quadrupling in
market capitalization, rising from 185 million to 807 million in the
post-2001 period.
More importantly, the SEC appears to be targeting much larger
companies during the post-January 1, 2002, period than it did in the
2005]
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earlier time frame. Average market capitalization for SEC enforce-
ment targets was more than twenty-three times bigger in the post-Janu-
ary 1, 2002, time period than in the earlier period, while the median
market capitalization went up by a multiple of over thirteen times.
These differences are significant at all conventional levels.
This large increase in the size of SEC targets carries over to com-
parisons with the size of defendant firms of private class actions alone.
As we saw in Table 2, in the pre-January 1, 2002, time period, private
actions without parallel SEC proceedings targeted larger companies
than those with parallel SEC proceedings. In the post-January 1, 2002,
time frame, this pattern reverses: average market capitalization of
firms subject to both private and SEC actions is more than six times
greater than for firms that are the subject only to private actions. A
similar but less pronounced pattern is observed in the median data.
The median differences in firm size are statistically significant at the
10% level.
Both the length of class period and the time to reach settlement
increase in the post-2001 cases, although the relative comparisons be-
tween cases with SEC parallel actions and those without remain the
same. Average class period length, a proxy of the number of investors
that may have been affected by fraud, increases from twelve months in
the pre-January 1, 2002, period to sixteen months in the post-January
1, 2002, period. The shift is even greater for companies with parallel
SEC proceedings, as mean class period increases from fifteen months
in Table 2 to twenty-three months in Table 3. Similar patterns are
visible in the time to settlement data, although the increase for private
actions alone is larger than that for private actions with parallel SEC
cases.
Finally, if we look at the ratio of settlement amount to provable
losses, we see that the pattern in Table 2 of greater percentage recov-
eries in private actions with parallel SEC actions has reversed itself in
the post-January 1, 2002, data shown in Table 3. AfterJanuary 1, 2002,
the average ratio of settlement amounts to provable losses for private
cases with parallel SEC proceedings drops from 20.8% to 4.8%, while
the median ratio declines from 8.3% to 2.4%. These changes are sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level. Given the large increase in the
dollar settlements for the cases with parallel SEC actions, there must
have been a very big jump in the amount of provable losses in these
cases, probably because the companies involved are much larger and
[VOL. 80:3
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the class periods somewhat longer.' 4 Private actions that do not have
accompanying SEC actions show a smaller decrease in average and
median levels for this ratio.
B. Multivariate Analysis of Settlement Amounts
Our next step is to see if we can explain the size of dollar settle-
ments using our data. In this section, we use multivariate regression
analysis to determine what factors influence the size of settlements.
As our dependent variable, we use a logarithmic transformation of the
dollar amount of the settlement paid in each case. For independent
variables, we look at the length of the class period in months, the log
of provable losses, the log of total assets, a measure of financial dis-
tress, and a dummy variable for the presence of an SEC enforcement
action. 15
Our independent variables are defined as follows. First, we in-
clude a measure of provable losses for each private action. We calcu-
late these values using the damage model that was discussed above.
Provable losses are a measure of the losses that investors suffered as a
result of the company's alleged fraud. Our hypothesis in this set of
regressions is that larger provable losses should increase the size of
the dollar settlement. We therefore anticipate that the sign of the
coefficient on this variable should be positive.
Our second independent variable is a measure of financial dis-
tress for each firm. As a proxy for financial distress we use the change
in the ratio of the company's book value to market value during the
interval between the filing of the suit and the settlement of it. Our
hypothesis is that companies that are in financial distress during the
settlement negotiations will be less able to pay larger settlements.
This leads us to expect a negative coefficient on this term.
14 This intuition is supported by the data in Table 3A below. It shows that the
market capitalization of companies with relatively low settlement amount to provable
loss ratios is much bigger than those with higher ratios.
TABLE 3A. PROVABLE Loss RATIOS BY MARKET CAPITALIZATION
Ratio of Settlement Amount to Ratio of Settlement Amount to
Provable Losses < 2% Provable Losses > 2%
Mean 9698.3 568.3
Median 1176.6 155.9
Number of observations 75 277
15 We use a logarithmic transformation of the settlement amount, provable
losses, and total assets of the defendant companies to mitigate the effect of large outli-
ers in the data.
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 903 2004-2005
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
As the third independent variable we added a measure of firm
size: total asset value. This is defined as current assets plus net prop-
erty, plant, and equipment plus other non-current assets including in-
tangible assets, deferred charges, and investments and advances.
Once again we do a logarithmic transformation of the variable. Our
hypothesis is that larger companies have greater resources to use in
settling actions, and we therefore expect that the sign of this term will
be positive.
Fourth, we add the length of class period as an independent vari-
able. This variable is measured in months. We include this term as a
measure of the number of defrauded investors. We believe that if
there are more defrauded investors, then the company will be under
more public pressure to increase the amount of the settlement.
Finally, to examine the effect of parallel SEC proceedings on pri-
vate class action settlements, we augment our regression with a
dummy variable that controls for the presence of an SEC enforcement
action. This dummy variable equals one if a private class action is ac-
companied by parallel SEC proceedings and zero otherwise.
Table 4 presents our regression results for the entire sample. The
adjusted R-squared for the equation is 55.1%.
TABLE 4. MULTIVARiATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE
Dependent Variable: Log (Settlement Amount)
Log (Provable Losses) 0.32 0.04 7.23 0.00
Measure of Financial Distress -0.06 0.05 -1.04 0.30
Log (Total Assets) 0.19 0.03 5.57 0.00
Class Period 0.02 0.01 2.81 0.01
SEC 0.29 0.12 2.41 0.02
Intercept 3.70 0.38 9.82 0.00
Adjusted R-squared 55.1%
Each of the independent variables has the expected sign and all
of them except financial distress are highly significant. We interpret
these results as consistent with our hypotheses that the absolute dollar
amount of a settlement is increased by the size of estimated provable
losses, the size of the target firm, the length of the class period, and
the presence of an SEC action.
We also estimated this equation with a dummy variable to control
for pre-January 1, 2002, and post-January 1, 2002, to see if settlement
sizes were statistically significantly larger in the latter time period.
However, this variable was insignificant in all of the regressions (re-
[VOL. 80:3
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suits not shown). Similarly, we tried various interaction terms to see if
cases with parallel SEC actions had different characteristics than those
without such cases, but all of these terms were statistically
insignificant.
C. Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of SEC Enforcement Actions
The last empirical question we ask is: what are the factors that
lead the SEC to file an enforcement action? In our prior work, using
a similar set of independent variables to those in Part II.B. above, we
found that the only statistically significant determinant for SEC filing
decisions was financial distress. Table 5 below revisits that question
with our expanded sample that includes post-2001 settlements of SEC
enforcement actions. Because the dependent variable is discontinu-
ous, we use a probit analysis.
Our first four independent variables are provable losses, financial
distress, market capitalization, and class period. These independent
variables are defined as previously. We expect that larger provable
losses will increase the likelihood of the SEC filing an enforcement
proceeding as it tries to target bigger frauds. Our second hypothesis is
that the SEC will also target financially distressed firms because it is
very concerned about highly visible fraud at these companies that will
have a high likelihood of hurting investors. For market capitalization,
we are unsure what sign to expect because while the SEC could
choose to go after larger companies that are more visible, it might also
prefer to go after weaker targets. Finally, we expect a positive sign on
the class period variable as a longer class period will mean a larger
potential number of defrauded investors, which should make it more
likely that the SEC will file an action.
To test for differences in SEC enforcement strategies between the
pre-January 1, 2002, time period and post-January 1, 2002, we include
time dummy variables for each independent variable as well as a sepa-
rate dummy to pick up changes in the overall level of enforcement
activity. We do so because our bi-variate analysis led us to suspect that
the SEC changed its targeting techniques in the later time period.
For the pre-January 1, 2002, time period, we find that financial
distress is the only statistically significant predictor of SEC enforce-
ment actions. This is consistent with the results in our earlier work.
We interpret this to mean that prior to January 1, 2002, the SEC was
most concerned with fraud at companies experiencing financial dis-
tress, probably because of the greater likelihood that investors at those
companies would suffer permanent and irreversible losses. It could
also reflect a potential preference by the SEC to choose weak
opponents.
20051
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TABLE 5. DETERMINANTS OF SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTION FILING
Dependent Variable: SEC
Provable Losses -0.04 0.08 -0.53 0.60
Provable Losses * Time Dummy 1.83 0.55 3.35 0.00
Measure of Financial Distress 0.19 0.10 1.89 0.06
Measure of Financial Distress * Time Dummy -0.16 0.13 -1.22 0.22
Market Capitalization -0.02 0.02 -0.94 0.35
Market Capitalization * Time Dummy -0.10 0.04 -2.57 0.01
Class Period 0.02 0.01 1.31 0.19
Class Period * Time Dummy 0.00 0.02 -0.18 0.86
Time Dummy 0.06 0.43 0.14 0.89
Intercept -1.04 0.22 -4.66 0.00
McFadden R-squared 10.8%
A very different pattern shows up in the post-January 1, 2002,
dummy variables. We see that the time dummy variables for provable
losses and market capitalization are statistically significant, although
the sign of the market capitalization variable is negative. We interpret
these findings to indicate that the SEC prefers targets where share-
holders have suffered greater provable losses with a bias toward select-
ing smaller firms.
CONCLUSION
Our results are consistent with the view that there was a shift in
the targeting of SEC enforcement actions after the end of 2001. We
find that the SEC seems to have shifted its enforcement focus away
from challenging frauds at firms in financial distress to seeking out
frauds at companies where investors may have suffered larger losses,
especially if they are smaller firms. This shift could be due to numer-
ous factors. First, the national elections in 2000 ushered in not only a
new set of commissioners but also a new Director of Enforcement at
the SEC. These changes may well have influenced the case selection
that led to settlements studied in our post-2001 cohort of settlements.
Second, public concern about fraudulent practices at the largest cor-
porations could well have provided impetus for the SEC's enforce-
ment staff to involve itself with more "high profile" cases than it
otherwise would have engaged.
We also add a note of caution about our interpretation of our
findings about SEC enforcement targeting. These results are based
on dates of settlements and not on the date the SEC began its enforce-
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ment investigation of a company. We have focused on the dates of
settlements because there frequently is little information as to when
the SEC has commenced its investigation since its initial investigations
lack the formality of public authorization by the commissioners.
Thus, there is no accurate way available to us to determine when the
SEC first began its investigation that ultimately led to the sanction be-
ing imposed on the respondent in that action. We nevertheless are
comfortable that most of the cases settled after 2001 would have been
at least initiated in the post-Enron atmosphere and in any case that
the sanctions imposed in 2002 and later were indeed in the shadow of
Enron.
With respect to settlement sizes in private class actions, we find
that provable losses, total assets, class period, and the presence of an
SEC enforcement action are all positively and significantly related to
the dollar amount of the settlement obtained in a private action.
These effects do not change over the time period of our sample. The
fact that provable losses are such an important determinant of the size
of actual recoveries supports the view that the "merits do matter."'16
16 Compare Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 500 (1991), who claims that all securities
fraud cases in her sample settled for approximately "one quarter of the potential dam-
ages ... [so that] a strong case in this group appears to have been worth no more
than a weak one." Id.
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